

**ignores the fact that Home Policy No. LPL-F871578 was not a third-party liability insurance contract.**

43. The Dismissal Order effectively repudiates Article (o) by ruling that the prosecution of civil or criminal misconduct by the New Hampshire Insurance Commissioner (the Liquidator) is the sole duty and responsibility of the Commissioner himself. It is misrepresentation. The Court was required to affirm my charges that the Order of Liquidation had been violated. Instead, it passed the buck to the Liquidator with the preposterous expectation that this high state official would act to discipline the agents in New York and in Texas acting in his behalf and under his supervision.

44. In summation, Bowles' litigation against the defendants in this Court was in reaction to, and a result of, the civil and criminal misconduct of the Liquidator and his agents in initiating litigation against Bowles in Texas in August 2005 in violation of Articles (e), (j), (k), and (m) of the Order of Liquidation. The Court refused to carry out its mandated duty under Article (o) of the Order. These facts were clearly before the Court. The statement in the Dismissal Order that the facts of the case were convoluted and impossible to extract is knowingly false and groundless. The Order of Dismissal exhibits rank bias and discrimination against me.

**The Federal Court's Misrepresentation that "the Story Began on June 11, 2003"**

45. **Certainly, the defendants wanted to the federal judge to believe what is stated in the Dismissal Order, that "the story begins in New Hampshire where, on June 13, 2003, Home Insurance Company ("Home"), a New Hampshire insurance company, was declared insolvent". This is blatantly false and constitutes a fraud on the court because, as noted above in EXHIBIT F, newly discovered evidence in the liquidation litigation placed the prime controlling date for this litigation as June 12, 1995, eight years prior to the date of the Order of Liquidation. On that date, June 12, 1995, the New Hampshire Insurance Commissioner entered into a Consent Decree and Services Agreement with the Zurich Insurance Company Limited, and Zurich subsidiary Risk Enterprises Management ("REM"), a TPA (third party administration) firm. The Consent Decree terminated Home's existence as a going concern licensed to carry on an insurance business for which it was organized.**

46. Per EXHIBIT F, Home was placed under the administration of REM on June 12, 1995 solely for the purpose of managing run-off of claims. No new insurance policies could be issued, and by the end of 1995, Home had no more employees. Former Home officials became REM employees, including Claims Manager Ronald F. Barta in the New York office. Obviously, REM officials had no authority to assign covered claim status to claims not officially filed before June 12, 1995.

47. As noted above and shown in EXHIBIT J, a copy of my lawsuit against BPS, et al was not transmitted to any Home office until January 16, 1996 when K. Charles Peterson sent a copy to a Mr. Oscar Allen at a Houston post office address. It was stamped as received by REM – Claims – Houston.

48. The duty to defend a policy is triggered when the insured is sued and tenders a copy of the complaint to the insurer with a letter demanding a defense. There was obviously no commitment of coverage by Home since REM was then in charge and its authority was solely with regard to claims certified for coverage by Home officials prior to June 12, 1995.

49. REM, in the eight years of its administration of Home's runoff claims did not appear in the case in Texas, contact the court, or contact me about a possible settlement. Texas insurance agent Daniels-Head has stated that it was not aware that there was an unresolved claim on the BPS policy with Home at the time of Home's liquidation in June 2003. Therefore, Daniels-Head issued no statutory notice of the liquidation to its list of active policy holders. There is absolutely no evidence that Home or REM ever recognized that any insured parties had made a claim against Policy No. LPL-F871578 requiring a defense be initiated.

50. The sworn testimony by TPCIGA's Amber Walker in September 2006 is false and perjurious in her claim of personal knowledge that Home Insurance had an agreement with George Bishop to represent Bishop, Peterson & Sharp, P.C. until the deductible was satisfied. Ms. Walker knew at the time that Home had ceased to exist as an operating company and had no employees in January 1996 when Home was first supplied with a copy of my suit. In the litigation in New Hampshire, the Liquidator could produce no copy of the alleged agreement.

51. The sworn testimony by TPCIGA's Amber Walker in September 2006 is false and perjurious in her assertion that my lawsuit constituted a "possible claim" against Home Policy No. LPL- F871578. It is a deliberate falsehood and fraud on the court because (a) the Exclusions Clause of the policy absolutely prohibited coverage of work done by uninsured party George M.

Bishop & Associates, and (b) all Home policies were cancelled and actions by Home officials and agents to initiate or continue Home business were prohibited by the June 13, 2003 Order of Liquidation

52. Sworn testimony by the Liquidator's agent Ronald F. Barta in November 2007 is also false and perjurious for stating that Home undertook to provide a defense of Policy No. LPL-F871578. Home had ceased to exist as an operating company and had no employees in January 1996 when Home was first supplied with a copy of my suit. At that time, Barta was a REM employee and no longer a Home official.

53. In summation, the record shows that the defendants brazenly committed fraud on the Court, misrepresented facts and withheld vital information in their defense of my suit. Their allegations that Home took affirmative action to defend the BPS policy is negated by the fact that Home had no employees in January 1996 to receive, construe or take action in defense of my suit against Bishop.

54. All information about Homes' demise and REM's assumption of administration of the company for runoff was suppressed.

55. Also suppressed was the fact that BPS (the insured party) was dissolved in the summer of 1993 and ceased to represent me without notifying me or The Home Insurance Company. Thereafter, George M. Bishop & Associates, an uninsured separate entity apart from BPS, became my attorney of record.. The Exclusions Clause of Policy No. LPL-F871578 specifically voided the policy as to legal services provided by George M. Bishop & Associates. I was never aware of these changes in circumstances until they were revealed to me in litigation in New Hampshire.

**Re: The Right to Bring Civil Suit for Violation of Texas Penal Code Section 37.09**

56. An important feature of the federal court's Order of Dismissal is on page 7 where the Court disposes of my civil action under Section 37.09 of the Texas Penal Code. This of course relates directly to my raft of complaints to the Texas Insurance Commission's Fraud Unit first made in December 2006 and continuing with this new rendition. The Fraud Unit has generally responded that the information I furnished was insufficient to warrant an investigation, but invited me to furnish additional information.

57. The Federal Court, like the Fraud Unit, was determined (desperate may be the better

term) to refuse jurisdiction of a hot potato case in which units of the insurance departments of two states (Texas and New Hampshire) are charged with criminal conduct, including fraud, conspiracy and money laundering. The Court therefore took a very hard line against my petition in order to dissuade and discourage me from seeking relief in that forum.

58. The Dismissal Order states:

“Furthermore, Bowles alleges a violation of Texas Penal Code §37.09, but does not assert any basis for his apparent belief he may bring a civil action based on an alleged violation of a penal statute. In fact, he cannot, as the penal statute in question does not expressly create a private cause of action. *See Reeder v. Daniel*, 61 S.W.3d 359,362 (Tex. 2001). (“the fact that the Legislature enacts a criminal statute does not necessarily mean that this Court may recognize a civil cause of action predicated upon that statute.”)

59. First of all, there is no Penal Code statute that “expressly” creates a private cause of action.

60. A review of the *Reeder* case discloses that the case was negligence *per se* action in which a social host was sued under the Texas dram shop act that makes it a crime for commercial bars to serve alcoholic beverages to minors. The Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff, holding that, “in determining whether a penal statute provides the basis for a civil cause of action, we must consider whether recognizing such an accompanying civil action would be inconsistent with legislative intent.” This opinion was consistent with an earlier (1997) Supreme Court decision on the same issue.

61. The *Reeder* opinion is **clearly not** a parallel to my case. I did not allege violation of the dram shop law. Accordingly, the Court’s statement that I could not bring a civil action based on §37.09 of the Penal Code is false. It was therefore the Court’s to duty consider and rule on whether the Texas Legislature intended that a criminal violation of the §37.09 could also be the basis for a civil court proceeding. The Court failed to do so. It presented no law to support its assertion that I could not bring a civil action based on Penal Code §37.09.

62. The cases available to settle the matter are all criminal cases, the most specific being *State v. Vasilas*, 187 S.W.3d 486 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) a document tampering conviction of a lawyer who made false entries in a petition for expunction in violation of Penal Code §37.10,

which is a sister statute to §37.09<sup>2</sup>. The opinion by the state's highest court asserts:

“By enacting §37.10, the legislature obviously meant to protect the people of the State by making it a crime to tamper with governmental records. By enacting §37.10, the legislature intended to prevent a multitude of harms, including the destruction of governmental records, the perpetration of a fraud upon the court, and the miscarriage of justice that could result from the use of falsified records. There is nothing absurd about the legislature criminalizing such conduct.

63. One case on point relating to insurance is *Elliott v. State*, 976 S.W.2d 355 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998) in which the defendant was convicted for altering a certificate of insurance to make it appear he had insurance coverage when he did not. This was also a §37.10 case. A §37.09 case involving insurance is *Arriaga v. State*, 2 S.W.3d 508 (App.4 Dist. 1999) where a defendant police officer knowingly completed a form to indicate a driver had insurance coverage when she did not. The record shows many instances of civil court proceedings based on violations of Penal Code §37.09 and §37.10.

64. It is to the discredit of the federal court that the Dismissal Order falsely expresses the Court's opinion that a citizen cannot prosecute a civil action based on the criminal statute prohibiting tampering with governmental records. The Court is certainly aware that the legislature has enacted civil statutes that provide relief for victims of government document tampering, two of which are Rule 12 and Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. It would be a recipe for dictatorship and anarchy if civil courts had no jurisdiction to rule on and discipline document tampering.

65. It is to the further discredit of the federal court that it failed and refused to do its mandated duty to apply Article (o) of the Order of Liquidation to recognize that the TPCIGA's action to defend Policy No. LPL-F871578 was document tampering and was in violation of Articles (e), (j), (k) and (m) of the Order.

#### **IV – BPS's Angry Lawyer – Why He Became Distressed and Lost His Composure**

##### **Fear of Indictment for Criminal Conduct**

66. After Judge Baker had rendered summary judgment against me in June 2006 dismissing

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<sup>2</sup> §37.09 is titled Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence, while §37.10 is titled Tampering With Governmental Record. The former is with intent to affect the outcome of an official proceeding; the latter with intent that it be taken as a genuine governmental record. Both statutes were violated by TPCIGA.

my case against Bishop et al, I filed a Motion for Rehearing on July 12, 2006. My 16-page, 16-exhibit motion (attached as **EXHIBIT M**) absolutely demolished the *res judicata* basis on which Marshall was awarded summary dismissal of my case. EXHIBIT M showed that, in violation of Rule 301, T.R.C.P., there were three “final” judgments issued by three separate courts in two underlying cases (Causes 1991-25939 and 1991-25939-A).

67. This proved that the February 12, 1996 “final judgment” issued by the 334th Court was not an appealable final judgment as Judge Baker ruled in dismissing my suit against Bishop et al. It destroyed *res judicata* as a defense to my legal malpractice lawsuit.

67. Distressed by my the contents of my motion, attorney Marshall sent my attorney a letter on July 18, 2006 threatening to impose sanctions against me and my attorney for our violation of an illegal permanent anti-suit injunction imposed on me on March 21, 2005 by the 55th District Court. (see copy of letter and Order attached as **EXHIBIT N**). **It is important to note that the March 2005 Order makes no reference to enjoining my right to challenge the finality of judgment in Cause No. 1991-25939 in my prosecution of Cause No. 1995-43235 in the 151st Court.** One court has no authority to summarily enjoin or terminate ongoing litigation in another court, but that was the purpose and effect of the 55th District Court’s permanent injunction.

68. Attorney Marshall and TPCIGA obviously recognized the close relationship of the cases. If I prevailed against Bishop et al, that would expose the criminal fraud, official oppression and conspiracy in the underlying litigation. It was imperative that my malpractice case be dismissed to cover up 15 years of gross judicial misconduct in the Harris County court system. He could not respond to my Motion for Rehearing with anything other than a threat to apply an injunction that he knew did not apply directly to my legal malpractice action in Cause No. 1995-43235.

#### TPCIGA’s Expanded Cover Up Activity

68A. That threat by TPCIGA’s attorney to apply for sanctions under the March 21, 2005 anti-suit injunction expands and extends the severity of TPCIGA’s criminal misconduct to include its cover up of the 15-year criminal official oppression to which I was subjected by Bishop and his co-conspirators in the fraudulent receivership proceeding.

68B. I suspect that TPCIGA and the Liquidator were not made aware that their intervention in my legal malpractice lawsuit in August 2005 would involve unresolved issues in the underlying case going back more than a decade. I doubt they knew that I had been summarily enjoined by anti-suit injunctions in three or more courts, **without one trial on the merits**, to deny my access

to justice to gain relief from the fraud, conspiracy and theft orchestrated by Bishop, by the opposing attorney, and by an unqualified receiver through execution of a fraudulent receivership proceeding. However, TPCIGA and the Liquidator were required to investigate and refuse participation in Bishop's money laundering scheme involving insurance fraud.

68C. Therefore, germane to this complaint is a copy of only my most recent attempt to gain my freedom from my status as a virtual prisoner held in captivity by the Harris County civil courts by illegal injunctions, including the original 1994 injunction summarily declaring me a terroristic threat to public servants and others whereby I was permanently barred from access to the courts to defend against their criminal kangaroo court activity to expropriate my property .

68D. Attached as EXHIBIT O is my March 24, 2010 Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to the 190th Civil District Court to which, understandably, there was no response, but in which I clearly laid out the facts regarding the criminal official oppression that I have been subjected to over period of some fifteen years. EXHIBIT O is the reason that TPCIGA's attorney found it necessary to invoke the 55th Court's March 2005 injunction in his response to my Motion for Rehearing against Judge Baker's summary dismissal of my legal malpractice lawsuit. He certainly could not rebut the facts, so he was compelled to use strong-arm tactics.

68E. I submit EXHIBIT O as a criminal complaint requiring consideration in connection with my complaint of TPCIGA's criminal misconduct by its intervention in my legal malpractice suit against BPS et al.

69. Attorney Marshall's employment by TPCIGA was obviously with the understanding that he would secure dismissal without ever being required to produce a copy of the fraudulent Home policy. He would thus escape liability for commission of a felony crime. It was planned that the 151st Court would grant summary judgment, which would moot my demand to see a copy of the insurance contract.

70. The existence of this scheme is evidenced by M&M's Ryan Nayar July 12, 2006 letter to my attorney referring my request to TPCIGA for the date of the purported BPS insurance policy. Mr. Nayar stated the request was moot. (see attached EXHIBIT P). It is further evidenced by the Marshall September 9, 2006 intemperate response to my Rule 12 Motion to Show Authority in which he threatened to file a motion to sanction me and my attorney for groundless and vexatious pleadings and for "multi-year disreputable

behavior". (see attached EXHIBIT Q).

71. Included in this response was the September 6, 2006 affidavit by TPCIGA official Amber A. Walker (see EXHIBIT A cited in paragraph 12 above) in which she testified on personal knowledge that, prior to its insolvency, Home Insurance had an agreement with George Bishop to represent BPS and related insureds until the policy deductible had been met, after which TPCIGA assumed defense of the policy pursuant after June 13, 2003 pursuant to Texas Insurance Code Article 21.28-C. She quoted Section 8(b) of the Guaranty Act as mandating TPCIGA's "duty to defend the insureds under a liability policy, to the extent that the policy obligations are covered claims under the Act."

72. Neither Article 21.28-C nor Section 8(b) of the Insurance Code mandate TPCIGA to defend void and cancelled insurance policies. Regarding Home Insurance, the Texas Insurance Code could not and did not override the New Hampshire Insurance Code or the Order of Liquidation to authorize TPCIGA to defend Policy LPL-F871578 in August 2005, more than two years after the liquidation order was issued on June 13, 2003.

73. Ms. Walker's affidavit constitutes criminal aggravated perjury, a fact I was only able fully document after she was later forced to produce a copy of Home Insurance Policy No. LPL-F871578, and after I gained access to some vital documents in the litigation against the Liquidator in the New Hampshire Superior Court in 2008, 2009 and 2010. I discovered and documented that:

- Home never contracted with George Bishop to provide attorney services to "BPS and related insureds".
- Home had no employees in the relevant period (1996) with whom Bishop or Bishop & Associates could have negotiated a contract.
- The Exclusions Clause of Home Policy No. LPL-F871578 specifically prohibited coverage of any claim against any business enterprise (such as George M. Bishop & Associates) not named in the Declarations, and of any claim based upon or arising out of work performed by an insured with respect to any business enterprise or association (i.e. George M. Bishop & Associates) not named in the Declarations.
- TPCIGA was prohibited by the Order of Liquidation issued by the New Hampshire Superior Court from either initiating, continuing, or intervening in, any proceeding involving The Home Insurance Company after June 13, 2003 without leave granted



in writing by the Liquidator and the Merrimack County Superior Court in New Hampshire. No such leave was requested, granted or issued.

74. Thus, both attorney Marshall and TPCIGA official Walker acted in conspiracy to obstruct justice by impeding my right of access to vital information, a violation of Texas Penal Code §39.03 - Official Oppression. They desperately and maliciously attempted to avoid producing the Home insurance contract for the express purpose of evading felony criminal culpability for violations of Penal Code §37.09 and §37.10.

75. Apparently resigning herself to the fact that an action in which TPCIGA is involved must relate to an insurance policy by a licensed insurance company, Judge Baker, at a hearing on September 18, 2006 ordered the production of the policy that was purported to authorize TPCIGA's intervention in my case.

#### V -The Criminal Act

76. On September 19, 2006 TPCIGA's attorney submitted Home Policy No. LPL-F871578 to the Court, accompanied by mean-spirited pleading stating that the unchallenged affidavit of TPCIGA official Amber A. Walker constituted proof of authority sufficient to deny my Motion to Show Authority. (A copy of said pleading is attached as EXHIBIT R). My copy of the pleadings and policy were received on September 25, 2006.

76A. TPCIGA and its attorney, John Marshall, presented cancelled Home Policy No. LPL-F871578 to the 151st Court on September 19, 2006 with knowledge of its falsity, with intent to affect the course or outcome of Cause No. 1995-43235, and with intent that it be taken as a genuine governmental record. This constituted a direct violation of both Texas Penal Code §37.09 and Texas Penal Code §37.10, which are classified as felony offenses.

77. On September 26, 2006 I (through my attorney) filed my response to the submission of Home Policy No. LPL-F871578 to the Court (see attached EXHIBIT S). I complained of having been a victim of a gigantic hoax by Bishop et al in conspiracy with Home and TPCIGA. Among other things, I pointed out how incredible it was that TPCIGA's Amber Walker had sworn to having personal knowledge that Home contracted with Bishop to represent the corporation and his fellow defendants in my lawsuit on a pro se basis from 1996 until August 2006, even while he was incarcerated as a felon and after he had been removed as a member of the State Bar.

78. This placed the issue of TPCIGA's authority to intervene in my litigation before 151st Court Judge Caroline Baker and she wasted no time in issuing her order dated September 27, 2006 to declare that attorney Marshall had adequately shown authority to represent BPS in defense of Home Policy No. LPL-F871578. (see attached **EXHIBIT T**).

#### **VI-Criminal Complaints**

79. On November 22, 2006 I sent a detailed complaint of felony criminal conduct by TPCIGA officials to the Executive Director and the Directors of TPCIGA. I requested that the Board investigate my complaint and take appropriate action in my behalf. There was no response; therefore a copy of the complaint was forwarded to the Texas Commissioner of Insurance and to Rick Perry, the Governor of Texas by a member of the Texas Justice Coalition on December 12, 2006. Again there was no response.

80. This resulted in my first complaint to the Fraud Unit of the Texas Insurance Commission on December 27, 2006 I have since continued submitting complaints to the Fraud Unit with demands for investigation and prosecution of persons guilty of felony violations of various sections of the Texas Penal Code, including §37.09 (Tampering), § 37.03 (Aggravated Perjury), §38.12 (Barratry), and § 15.02 (Criminal Conspiracy). Recently, on October 12, 2010, I transmitted additional information to the Fraud Unit that included my October 12, 2010 complaint of public corruption to the United States Department of Justice in Houston. Other agencies and individuals made privy to my complaints are the Harris County District Attorney, the Texas Attorney General, the New Hampshire Department of Justice (counsel for the Liquidator of The Home Insurance Company), and TPCIGA Executive Director Marvin Kelly.

#### **VII – CONCLUSION**

81. Above considered, everything has been said, and nothing has been done. In intentional disregard of the criminal violation of §37.09 and §37.10 of the Texas Penal Code by TPCIGA, the Fraud Unit has ratified and supported Judge Baker's false judgment rejecting my Motion to Show Authority on the strength of perjurious testimony by TPCIGA's Amber A. Walker and Ronald Barta, the Liquidator's agent in New York.

82. The same is true for the federal court in Austin for its June 2009 rendition of an Order of Dismissal that holds my litigation to seek relief from official oppression and fraud and

conspiracy to be spurious, frivolous and sanctionable. To wit: (1)The federal court deliberately disregarded its mandated duty under Article (o) of the Order of Liquidation to act in aid of and be complementary to the Superior Court in carrying out the terms of the Order of Liquidation. (2) It misrepresented the Home Insurance policy as providing for third-party beneficiaries. (3) It failed to recognize that Home Insurance was under third-party administration for eight years prior to its liquidation. (4) It held me in violation of Section (n)(6) of the Order of Liquidation while ignoring the fact that TPCIGA and Home wholly repudiated the Order in violating Articles (e), (j), (k) and (m) that precede Article (n).

83. Money laundering was a paramount objective of the conspiracy involving TPCIGA and the Liquidator to secure dismissal of my lawsuit against George Bishop et al in the 151st Court. By the Order of Dismissal, the multi-million dollar receivership fraud in the underlying suit was covered up to deny me access to justice in that litigation.

84. The refusal of the Fraud Unit to enforce the laws constitutes breach of responsibility and duty by the Texas Insurance Department.

#### **VII – Resubmission of Verified Criminal Complaint and**

#### **Demand for Prosecution of Criminal Insurance Fraud**

85. On January 5, 2010 I submitted a 7-page complaint of criminal conduct to the Fraud Unit, charging that TPCIGA intervened in my malpractice action in the 151st Court in August 2005 and in doing so committed violations of the Texas Penal Code. I listed 8 such violations.

86. My January 5, 2010 complaint included some of the information included herein, specifically the letters and documents obtained in July 2009 in doing discovery in litigation of my Disputed Proof of Claim in the New Hampshire Superior Court. The information given the Fraud Unit at that time proved beyond a reasonable doubt that TPCIGA had no authority to intervene in my malpractice lawsuit in August 2005 in defense of Home Policy No. LPL-F871578. I charged that, In doing so, TPCIGA committed violations on the Texas Penal Code as well as the Texas Insurance Code. Copies of the criminal complaint were distributed to parties in New Hampshire, to TPCIGA, to the Harris County District Attorney and to the presiding judge of the 151st District Court in Houston.

87. I supplemented the January complaint in March, June and October 2010 with additional information about developments in New Hampshire. Also, I informed you that in 1995 the U.S.

Department of Justice had found my complaints of blatant receivership fraud in the underlying case to be actionable under the Texas Penal Code. I was advised to seek criminal indictments, which I did without success in many complaints to the Harris County District Attorney's office.

88. To my knowledge no action against the fraudfeasors has been taken.

89. The above new rendition to the Fraud Unit is as comprehensive and exhaustive as possible. I believe I have left no issues in doubt regarding my charges of insurance fraud, conspiracy, and money laundering.

90. I hereby resubmit to the Fraud Unit as a new verified complaint of criminal insurance fraud my January 5, 2010 complaint, now supported by the above exhaustive history and documentation showing felony criminal conduct beyond any reasonable doubt.

91. I request investigation of criminal conduct in violation of both state and federal crime laws. I demand enforcement of the Texas Insurance Code by the Fraud Unit in cooperation with the Texas Attorney General and the Harris County District Attorney.

92. My records are available for your inspection and use.


Respectfully submitted,

  
Harry L. Bowles

Attachments: Exhibits A - T; Sworn Criminal Complaint

Certificate of Service to Attorneys Involved

On this 21st Day of January 2011, I forwarded copies of the above Fraud Unit complaint to the following attorneys previously involved in the subject litigation: to Mr. Craig L. Reese, Fletcher & Springer, LLP, 8750 N. Central Expressway, 16th Floor, Dallas, TX 75231; to Ms. Joanna Lippman Salinas, Fletcher, Farley, Shipman & Salinas, 823 Congress Ave., Austin, TX 78701; to Mr. Eric A. Smith, Rackeman, Sawyer & Brewster, 160 Federal Street, Boston, MA 02110-1700; to Mr. Daniel W. Jordan, Law Office of Daniel W. Jordan, 4807 Spicewood Springs Road, Building One, Suite 1220, Austin, TX 78759; and to Ms. Maryalice W. Cox, MehaffyWeber, P.C., 500 Dallas Street, Houston, Texas 77002.

  
Harry L. Bowles